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1. In June 1953 [redacted] following  
Finnish document entitled "The Finnish Communist Party in the Present  
Situation" [redacted] describes the Party's organization, tactics and  
objectives. [redacted]

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## "THE FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION"

### A Look at the Past

2. "The roots of history of Finnish Communist thought can be found in the labor movement in 1910 which was divided into three main directions. The leaders belonging to the radical wing formed the Finnish Communist Party at the end of October 1918 in Moscow and its first act in Finland consisted of the seizure of control of the labor organizations through leftist radical front organizations. The Finnish Communist Party has at no time disclaimed the theses of its organizational meeting, which among other things, prohibit a return to the former democratic procedures in various parts of society and which require that (in the third thesis):

"The laboring class must seize all authority through revolution and establish an iron dictatorship of labor; the objective thus is the destruction of the bourgeois state and not the establishment of democracy either before the revolution nor through the revolution."

3. "While the Finnish Communist Party was organizing political activity under various front organizations during the 1920's and seized a position of influence in the trade union organization, it established an extensive illegal operation which assured its continuation of operations even after the period when the Communists were excluded from the Diet. The result of an effective popular front tactic was that at

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the end of the 1930's the Communists were carrying on considerable activity through front organizations. Organizationally, the Finnish Communist Party could have undertaken political action during the Winter War of 1939-40, but the ideological crises discouraged illegal activity. This obstacle did not exist to the same extent at the end of World War II and the relatively small influence of the Finnish Communist Party during the last phases of World War II did not arise from a lack of desire for action, but mainly from the more extensive and efficient counter-measures taken by government authorities.

4. "At the end of World War II the Finnish Communist Party had only 1,200 members 'dispersed here and there all over the country' in the words of Kauko Heikkila in 1947. Favorable political conditions aided its rapid strengthening so that before the purge of the Finnish Communist Party began in 1948, it was claimed that it had 55,000 members. The purges and separations reduced the membership to less than 40,000, from which it has gained slowly, being currently approximately 42,000. The years 1944-1948 were a period of progress for Communism into positions through which the people's democracy should have been installed even in Finland. From the period of Leino strikes in 1948 until the autumn of 1952, the Finnish Communist Party had a stage during which its most important objective was maintaining the influence which it had gained, first through the strikes at the Arabia plant and in Kemi, and later, making use of the common front and the people's front themes. An entirely new phase, however, has been apparent in its operations since the autumn of 1952.

Why has the Situation Changed?

5. "Several reasons can be shown why the situation has changed to such an extent (in respect to Communist activities and influence) that it would be appropriate to speak of the development of an entirely new phase. The change in the overall situation is the greatest factor. The instability of the postwar years - mainly in the economic and political spheres - may be considered as having ended only this fall [1952]. The efforts of stabilization have effected the thinking of the large masses of population only recently to the degree that a more peaceful phase of development has been possible. Those attitudes, which in general have been more influenced by the so-called symbolizing incidents than by the facts of daily life, have more or less ended with the war reparation payments, which may be generalized as having influenced the entire post-war transitional period. The political discussion and daily events have - as they did before World War II - turned from large fateful affairs to more practical daily affairs and even power politics can no longer raise such anxiety and restlessness as during the postwar years.
6. "The Finnish Communist Party also has its own internal factors. Adjustment to the common front and the people's front tactics has been successfully carried out, and especially the peace movement (opposition to which on the part of other political parties has already become tiresome) appears to be maintaining the hold it has gained in the SKDL (Finnish Peoples Democratic Union). This, of course, encourages continuation of the same tactics. The Communists have, by means of extensive education work, put their organizations into better condition than they have been in during any other previous time; the economic operational resources have been assured; and the necessary foreign political relations with the peoples democracies are in order and can always be used for purposes of internal support when the problems require the support of large forces. The greatest asset, however, that the Finnish Communist Party has, is the apathy of the other parties to fight communism, either by acts or by words.

The Forces of the Finnish Communist Party

7. "The forces at the disposal of the Finnish Communist Party form a pyramid

in which the various layers are all the more broad the further and lower they are from the leading layers. If the leading elements, together with the agents and those organizers who are only on partial pay are considered as a summit of the pyramid, then the total number of personnel involved is between 5,000 and 6,000. The leading elements (leaders) and the agents - including those of the fellow traveler movements - consist of approximately 2,200 - 2,500 people. The organizers on partial pay, who are found in the employment of, for example, the communes, the trade union movement, the cooperative movement, insurance firms and business firms, consist of about 2,500 - 3,500 persons. An accurate estimate of the size of this group is difficult to obtain, since payments are not made through official channels but through the intermediary of illegal operational contacts.

8. "The next layer is formed from the illegal cadres of the Finnish Communist Party, which consisted of only about 1,200 persons in 1944. This group includes the members of the supervisory section of the Finnish Communist Party, the members of the Union of Comrade Societies (Toverikuntien Liitto), as well as the members of various trained shock forces. At the same time when the Finnish Communist Party has made use of the people's front tactic it has also given special attention to the training of illegal cadres. This group is the one by means of which a possible seizure of power would be carried out. Some of its functions have been publicly described, such as the seizure of police establishments, arms depots, traffic centers, etc., especially by Onni Mikkola in his brief memoir 'In the Bread and Company of the Communists' (Kommunistien leivissä ja Hampaisissa) on pages 59-61. A number of independent information sources have estimated the total personnel of the illegal cadres to be from 15,000 to 20,000 persons.
9. "Most of the foregoing layers consist of revolutionaries ready for anything. But in addition to these there are from 16,000 to 22,000 persons holding Finnish Communist Party membership who believe fundamentally in a revolution and who have been trained for the creation of a revolutionary attitude, but who, nevertheless, have not attained sufficient political reliability. The majority of these persons are Finnish Communist Party activists who are used for all types of party functions from sales to various types of group study. The remainder are Finnish Communist Party members who have, either through a too short membership period or because of the casual nature of their membership, been less active in party activities.
10. "It is difficult to say how much of the SKDL membership consists of others than Finnish Communist Party members. Persons who themselves have served in positions of trust and as agents of both the Finnish Communist Party and the SKDL estimate that there are from 60,000 to 80,000 such members in the SKDL. This group participates mostly because of its 'radical conscience' and is reminiscent of that element which during the decade of the 1910's formed 'centrist' groups and the radicals of the trade union movement during the 1920's. Without doubt, it also includes opportunists influenced by the postwar foreign policy.
11. "The SKDL voters, of whom there are about three for each one of the foregoing groups, form the base of the pyramid. There is no doubt but that this group reacts more on the basis of emotion than do the members of the SKML, among whom intellectual considerations have always influenced the amount of political activity. This body of voters has not, however, been influenced to a sufficient degree by other parties, which, except for the foregoing emotional factors, results mainly from the actual sociological and economic inequalities prevailing in the lives of these people, and also from the fact that the other parties have not found the technical means of reaching this element of the population in their educational work. These people do not read the newspapers of other parties nor attend the meetings of other parties and can be reached only by person to person contact.

The People's Front Tactic

12. "An examination of Finnish Communist Party activities during 1952 reveals that until late spring the Communists had difficulty in adjusting to the popular front tactic ordered by the Cominform in May 1951. Open disagreement was apparent between followers of the earlier 'straight line' and the followers of the peoples front tactics, especially at trade union meetings. The Finnish Communist Party offer to collaborate with the Agrarian Union and the Social Democratic Party in the autumn of 1952 may be taken as a conclusive manifestation of the fact that all Communists were required to follow the people's front tactic.

13. "The decision to use the people's front tactic, which, briefly stated, means the use of all possible fellow traveler movements and other means of common action as increasing attention is given to illegal activity, was adopted at the Comintern Congress held in the summer of 1935 in Moscow. Before World War II considerable success was attained by this tactic even in Finland. All democratic voters were thus successfully mobilized against Fascism, Nazism, and against other 'sinister reactionary' movements. Among the intellectuals, the cultural radicalism sponsored by the people's front tactic became a fad. The art and the literature of the Soviet Union was described as being of an especially distinctive type. With the support of the Finnish Communist Party 'the union for the rights of man' was able to obtain about 30,000 signatures on a petition against capital punishment. A 'workers common front' was created in the trade union movement, to which the Communists had been in opposition during the 1930s, to fight the leaders of the trade union movement and the 'big capitalists'. At the communal level 'wildcat' leftist election unions were formed, and in the sports, temperance, and cooperative movements, the Communists also gained considerable successes by means of the people's front idea of collaboration. The collaboration was not limited merely to the working people nor to the Social Democrats, but the depression-period separatist political movement of the small farmers indicated that the Communists were also operating within spheres that traditionally think along bourgeois lines.

14. "The penetration phase of the present people's front tactic was mainly completed during the period from the summer of 1951 to the summer of 1952. The various international congresses, to which they have attempted to give non-Communist reputations, have been especially typical of this tactic. The Vienna Congress for the protection of children, the Moscow Economic Congress, the various peace congresses and the Congress of Jurists and the Congress of Cultural Workers, etc, are the best known examples of the present use of the peoples front tactic. Similar devices, however, are being used also on smaller scale. During 1952 we have seen in Finland the Congress of the Finnish Working Youth and the Congress of the Construction and Woodworking Union people which, despite their names, are Communist meetings.


15. "The Finnish Communist party plays its part in the people's front tactic through the organizations which it directs and which by their names appear completely non-partisan, such as the 'youth societies' all the way to the 'women' of some particular locality. The use of the name of the SKDL is part of the same tactic, for many simple people, especially in the rural areas - would in no manner willingly support the Communists, if they did not believe the SKDL to be an entirely different matter, that is, some kind of a bona fide working peoples party, through which they find expression for the Finnish peoples traditional hatred of overlords.

16. "The so-called peace movement is one of the most effective weapons of the people's front movement, both on a worldwide basis, as well as in war-weary Finland. Its own propaganda and organization, as well as the support given it by all the other Communist organizations, have already created sufficient assurance that neither the voters of the Finnish Communist

Party nor those of the SKDL can easily be shaken from it by any action of the other parties. Although the possibilities of the peace defenders to obtain more support for the Communists have already decreased considerably, their significance to the parliamentary strength of the Finnish Communist Party, that is the number of votes, must not be underestimated as many other parties which have tired of fighting this propaganda have already begun to do.

Belief in Organization

17. All of the writers from Trotsky and Lenin to Stalin analyzing the Russian Bolshevik revolution have, without exception, emphasized the decisive significance of organizational work and of organization. Thus, all reverses that the Finnish Communist Party has suffered, most recently those following the strike at the Aarhia plant in 1947 and the strike at Kemi in 1949, have been explained as arising from a lack of organization. The faith in organization is also apparent in the current structure and activities of the Finnish Communist Party.
18. The legal organization of the Communist Party follows the general pattern of ordinary party organization at the district and communal level and also in its party headquarters. Those bloc groups and village groups into which the party sections are divided and which include from four to ten persons may also be considered within the sphere of legal activities. The same may be said of those trade unions, sports, cooperative, and small farmer sections which at the district and communal organization levels direct the practical party work in the field concerned. The foregoing pattern, however, is not followed in the illegal organization, where for example, the district areas are divided into sectors formed from communes and these in turn are divided within their supervisory section functions into supervisory districts, under which liaison men operate under various titles in different localities. The operational instructions and orders of the legal organization are generally transmitted through the mail, but illegal organization instructions are delivered through a courier system. For this purpose, approximately 200 motorcycles are registered under the names of individual members of the Finnish Communist Party.
19. The official party operational unit of the Finnish Communist Party is the bloc or village group, whose members must, if there are industries in the community, belong also to workshop organizations. Since exact information, such as membership in cooperative, trade unions, sports and other organizations is maintained on each member, it is a relatively simple matter to get out the Communist vote at the elections of these organizations by means of a mere order. Preparations for the annual meetings and the elections of various organizations have been carried out to such an extent that, for example, a preparatory meeting of the Finnish Communist Party members is held prior to that of a local SKDL organization annual meeting, at which detailed decisions are reached regarding personnel problems and the use of floor speakers, etc, so that no unexpected event may occur.
20. An even greater number of indications have become apparent during the period of the peoples front tactic that the Communists are attempting to create cells in non-partisan and the so-called common organizations among others than the working people. Organizations engaged in social work have especially attracted their attention including such bodies as the disabled veterans organizations. Whenever the regular membership could not be induced to leave meetings early, by means of wearisome procedures, before the voting takes place at the end of the meeting, the Communists have used individual 'education' on detailed questions in order to obtain a temporary majority in the leadership of the organization concerned. Whenever this type of an attempt has been successful it has not been long before this organizational advantage has been made use of, at least for communist propaganda purposes.

Direct and Indirect Propaganda

21. "The Finnish Communist Party is well aware of the fact that different groups require different approaches. The result is that the various layers of the Communist-dominated pyramid propaganda may be quite different, in fact may even be contradictory. The reiteration of the need for revolution by force and the necessity for the use of outright misrepresentation and prevarication for the creation of a revolutionary attitude is not avoided in the direct Communist propaganda aimed at the two upper layers of the pyramid. Such straight talk however, is avoided among the members of the SKDL and among the ordinary voters, the 'ideal' conditions prevailing in the Peoples Democracies and their defense of peace being emphasized instead.

22. "Communist propaganda technique attempts to present its own affairs in the best possible light and those of others in the most unfavorable light. The most common methods in the first category are the use of comparisons based on percentages and that of taking a positive position as proponent of all possible idealistic objectives, such as peace, democracy, independence, etc. In the propaganda directed against other parties all unfavorable individual incidences are generalized as evidence of overall truth, and even the slightest convictions are used as basis for argument, together with the greatest possible use of personal smearing. Examples of these are not necessary since they can be found in every issue of a Communist newspaper. The use of outright falsehood, however, requires some attention. This method is based on the premise that complete falsehood repeated frequently enough and extensively enough will in time make people believe that it contains some truth, since 'there is no lie so great that it does not contain a grain of truth'. The principle of the total lie was used also by the National Socialist with considerable success.

23. "The effect of Communist propaganda, however, is based not on a mere reliance on the above techniques, which are used in the form of literature as well as in intensive personal contact propaganda. The Communist successes arise equally as much from the fact that the other parties, with the exception of the Communist supporters, consider Communist arguments so outrageous or inept that they do not consider it necessary to counter them except in unusual circumstances. Although this attitude does suffice for the supporters of the non-Communist parties, it cannot however, accomplish anything positive by way of opening the eyes of SKDL voters. Postponing the countering of Communist propaganda until the approach of elections is ineffectual, for then all the voters have developed caution and resistance to any propaganda, and it becomes especially difficult to have any effect upon them.

The Finnish Communist Party and Economic Facts

24. "In examining the attitude of the Finnish Communist Party to economic facts generally, and to economic policy and to state finances, it is apparent that their propaganda makes use only of those facts which will support overall Communist political propaganda. During those periods when the Finnish Communist Party does not share in the responsibility for the economic development of the country, it uses all means to attempt gains from its position of opposition. During the Pekkala administration it was not unusual to hear Communist leaders making speeches in which they opposed strikes and wage increases, even to the extent of urging increases in work and in production, since these are the only logical means of improving the standard of living. The best example of this situation is, perhaps, Ville Pessi's report on the economic policy to the Seventh Finnish Communist Party Conference in 1946, in which he stated that:

"If only wages are raised without an improvement in work efficiency or increased production, then prices will rise even more than wages and the working people will be left even further behind. Under the capitalist system we cannot prohibit a reasonable profit to industrial establishments in the control of individuals or firms."

25. "After the Communists were relegated to the position of opposition, they have not of course made these kind of speeches-attempting instead to show that everything is going in the wrong direction. In discussing the state budget for 1953, the Communists have given attention to such items as the improvement of buildings in the rural areas; the production of the dairy industry; rural electrification; rural schools; elimination of the refresher training for the reservists; care of military conscripts and to the increase of their daily allowances; the threat to Finnish peace occasioned by membership in the World Bank; unemployment; and the removal of the amount of money marked for the social welfare ministry under the argument that the workers employed in private industries should be guaranteed by law the right to a pension equal to that of government employees and officials; etc. An examination of these items shows that the Finnish Communist Party need not fear that even one of these propositions will gain approval, but the proposals are made completely without regard to economic facts and as mere propaganda objectives. As such they are extremely effective, for there will always be people who think that such proposals are rejected through the ill will of other groups, never thinking that the proposals could never be fulfilled in practice.

26. "The Communist proposals for decreasing the tax burden are also of the same type. The general argument that the funds needed can be obtained from the big capitalists suffices for their purpose, without a detailed explanation of the quantities needed and from whom to be obtained. This argument is used not only in regard to the state budget but also in connection with proposals to decrease communal taxes.

27. "The Communists treat the economic factors in greater detail in communal politics than they do in Diet politics. In fact, Communist demagogic propaganda victory celebrations in the communes are held on this very basis. Specifically, this is aided by the fact that, before the communal elections of 1950, a special campaign was put on through the entire Finnish Communist Party organization in which it was pointed out that communal politics are only a part of the class struggle which must not be relegated to a mere discussion of minor inequalities, pointing to the authoritarian statements from other countries. The final purging which took place in the Finnish Communist Party in 1949 was directed mainly at those Communist communal officials who had made the error of placing the interests of their communes before those of the Finnish Communist Party. The line of reasoning therefore, briefly stated, is that the removal of the inequalities would be to the disadvantage for the creation of a revolutionary attitude and, in practice nothing should be done for the removal of the inequalities, although aggressive propaganda must be carried on on the basis of these inequalities. This factor is also the predominant one when the Finnish Communist Party discusses wages and labor condition agreements.

#### Finances of the Finnish Communist Party

28. "In regard to the cooperative movement, the Communists never fail to reiterate that they are the only true representatives of the cooperative movement. This argument, however, has not prevented the Finnish Communist Party from creating for itself since 1947 an extensive and significant private enterprise network. It includes not only the best known large enterprises in the entire country, but also private and incorporated stores selling small goods as well as general stores, etc. The number of the business enterprises has become so great that many district organizations no longer need funds from the main office and can carry on their operations from the profits of the business. Even in those instances in which the enterprises are nominally owned by private individuals, they are supervised and directed by Communist party interests. Each year a detailed report must be made of the management of these enterprises to the financial department of the Finnish Communist Party concerning their profitability and net proceeds even to the extent that the form for the report has a special space for remarks concerning misappropriations that may have occurred.

29. "Since the active Communists are members of the Finnish Communist Party and of many other fellow traveler movements, they must pay considerable amounts each month in membership fees. It is not unusual, therefore, that a physical laborer might have to pay 500 [Finnish] marks a month regularly as membership fees. In addition, there are extra fees and also voluntary gifts to the democratic newspapers, etc. The so-called people's fund into which all of the Communist workers apparently will soon be required to place all their savings from other financial institutions is a new source of funds which promises to be important in the future. The people's fund was established in 1948.

30. "The funds obtained from abroad, the amounts of which are difficult to estimate, form a different category. It is known, however, for instance, that from 500 thousand to 1 million marks of such funds have been obtained for the construction of local 'people's houses', without mention of amounts that the main treasuries of the Finnish Communist Party and the SKDL might have received. Also worthy of note are the gifts that the Sirola Institute has received from time to time from its 'American friends.'

31. "Considering that the illegal operations of the Finnish Communist Party cost is at least equal to the overt expense and operation costs of its various organizations, the estimate of the overall budget of the Finnish Communist Party amounts to a considerable figure. The extensive headquarters staff and an even more extensive field personnel force requires in itself large funds, without taking into consideration the funds required for the maintenance of unprofitable newspapers, extensive propaganda, and illegal operations. Estimates of the funds used for direct or indirect Communist operations during 1952 range from 400 to 500 million marks.

The Agricultural Policy of the Finnish Communist Party

32. "Although the Communists have had considerable success especially in those backward areas in which there are no possibilities for industrialization, they have, however, found it extremely difficult to get a hold of [sic] the agrarian population. The main obstacle here has been that the Finnish Communist Party has not been able to explain too clearly its objective of agricultural collectivization. The pattern briefly has been that in the first instance as much land as possible is demanded to be divided among everyone so that at a later stage it can be taken from everyone to form collective farms. The hunger for land - especially among the unlanded rural population - is, according to the estimates of the Communists, so great that it must not be opposed. The numerous Communist bills and propagandistic proposals indicate awareness of this fact very clearly. It is typical, however, of the structure of the Finnish Communist Party that those small farmer sections which lead operations in this field are frequently composed of everything but small-farmer members. For example, the small farmer section of Forssa in 1951 included tailors, shoemakers, loggers, etc but not a single small farmer. While Communist work among the rural population is carried on with extreme caution and clear Communist objectives are avoided, in the cadre schools, however, they emphasize that the present phase is merely a transitional period after which the cadres must be able to show the masses the necessity for collectivization. The book 'The Peasantry and Marxism' (Talonpoikaissto ja marxilaisuus) by Aarne Hulkonen may be taken as evidence of this attitude.

33. "With the exception of the proposals for the establishment of the so-called machine-tractor stations (which have been a favorite method of crushing the independence of the agrarian population in East Germany) the Communists have generally been able to operate among the agrarian population with extreme caution and without arousing suspicion. They have accomplished this partially by the fact that their tactics have been different in northern Finland from what they have been in southern Finland, especially in the

question of farm prices. The greatest factor, however, has been the Small Farmers' Union (Pienviljelijain Liitto), which is estimated currently to have a membership of more than 20,000 and has proved to be a useful means of increasing Communist influence in the rural areas. The method of operation through the Small Farmers' Union, of which the Communists have seized control, is as follows: officials of the Small Farmers' Union are first sent out to establish other small farmer units, especially in outlying areas, after which SKDL officials arrive to participate in the operations of the organization. It has even happened that officials of the Small Farmers' Union on trips - paid for out of state funds - have performed both of these organizing functions at the same time. Caution in respect to the agrarian population has not been characteristic only of the Finnish Communist Party, for the same tactic has been followed in all the other People's Democracies. For example, in Bulgaria, where the number of agricultural cooperatives was only 0.2% of the number of farms in 1944 and 14.3% at the end of 1949, it was only 53.3% in 15 Oct 51. The collectivization of agriculture has thus been undertaken considerably later after the seizure of political power. The development in this respect in the other People's Democracies, and how the events have taken place one following the other, can, perhaps, best be explained elsewhere.

The Finnish Communist Party in the Trade Union Movement

34. "According to Communist teachings, the trade union movement is 'that lever with which our party can prepare for the revolution' in the words of Kauko Heikkila delivered before the Helsinki cadres of the Finnish Communist Party in February 1947. For this reason, it has appeared during certain years that the struggle against Communism has been merely a trade union affair. In the present situation, however, the fact remains that control of the Communist-controlled trade unions cannot be wrested away from the Communists, for they can maintain their control through the use of actual and paper memberships and by means of the Communist sections. The situation may therefore be considered as being frozen in the trade unions.
35. "The only trade union within which anything is currently going on is the Textile Workers Union (Kutomatyöväen Liitto). This Communist-controlled union was separated from membership in the SAK (Federation of Trade Unions) in May 1952 and later a new union, the Textile and Clothing Workers Union (Kutoma-ja Neuletyöväen Liitto) controlled by the Social Democrats, was admitted in its place. Both of these unions had labor agreements with the appropriate association of employers, in force until the end of 1952. Although both unions are approximately equal in membership, the majority of the workers in this field still remained unorganized. Although the struggle 'for the souls of the workers' might turn out unfavorably for the Communists in this field, it is not impossible that the Communists might invoke unrest and even strikes in this field about the end of the year [1952]. Among the other Communist controlled trade unions, especially the food, leather, and foot-wear industry workers, the foregoing [?] factors could very well increase unrest, but it is unlikely that the Communists would go to the point of separation as in the case of the textile workers where the situation has become even more rigidly frozen than formerly.
36. "In those trade unions in which the Communists form the minority opposition, they have constantly attempted to maintain an atmosphere criticism against the leadership. The best known of these opposition movements was the one which took place in the Metal Workers Union (Metallityöväen Liitto) in the autumn of 1952 in connection with the increase in membership fees and that against the leadership for calling an extra meeting of the union. It does not appear, however, that in the near future the Communist opposition movements, which follow a similar pattern in all the unions, could lead to any great successes.

Youth and Intellectuals

37. "The Communists have attempted to increase their hold upon the youth through other than the name of the Finnish Communist Party. Nevertheless, the Communists hold upon the youth remains relatively weak. The Finnish Democratic Youth Union (Suomen Demokraattinen Nuorisoliitto) has about 20,000 members and the 'democratic pioneers' approximately 50,000 members. These organizations, however, are extensive enough to furnish the membership replacements required by the Finnish Communist Party. For instance, in the autumn of 1952 there were instances throughout the country in which the Finnish Democratic Youth Union locals each 'relinquished' from 20 to 50 of their members to the Finnish Communist Party. Such relinquished members have thereafter received special training in respect to their youth operations which has prepared them for subsequent promotions. It is self evident that the leaders of the youth organizations, as well as those of the other fellow-traveler movements, are without exception members of the Finnish Communist Party, although this fact may not be readily admitted in public.

38. "The Communists have a relatively weak hold organizationally on the student youth of the country. Despite its efforts, the Academic Socialist Society (Akateeminen Sosialistiseura - ASS) has not been able to enlist any but the children of Communists. That phase of the people's front tactic which is known as 'cultural radicalism' and which the Communists are attempting to popularize among the student youth of the country, has much greater significance. The failure of the Federation of Student Societies (Ylioppilaskuntien Liitto) to take a definite stand in regard to the activities of the Communist controlled international organization has created an especially favorable atmosphere for this trend.

39. "The Finnish Communist Party has expended its efforts in vain among the other intellectuals, although Finland does have its active 'democratic jurists' and 'democratic physicians'. It is difficult to say at this moment to what degree the cultural exchange sponsored by the Finland-Soviet Union Society has aroused sympathies among the intellectuals toward Communism. For the time, however, it has been considered an entirely different matter. Since the main Communist theme among the youth and the intellectuals is the ideal conditions which these groups enjoy in the peoples democracies, it would be entirely appropriate if it were pointed out what these conditions are like in reality, especially in East Germany. This would be a fitting counter-measure to the 'discouragement to the intellectuals' of which the Communists accuse us. The Communist sympathies of certain radical groups of artists have not yet gained the extent or hold among the intellectuals to the degree they have in Denmark, for instance.

The Finnish Communist Party and Democracy

40. "The fact that the Finnish Communist Party has used the undefined 'people's democracy' concept after World War II has not, however, prevented the Finnish Communist Party from continuing to support the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Whenever the Communists have been forced to defend themselves against the accusation of dictatorship, they have always tried to argue that 'the bourgeois democracy' is a 'capitalistic dictatorship' and that the proletarian dictatorship is the broadest form of economic and social democracy. Why other political parties have not given sufficient attention to this vulnerability of the Finnish Communist Party (at least in respect to the actual extent that control by common people or the masses is possible in either a democracy or a dictatorship) has never been efficiently explained. The 'democratic centralism', which is directed from the top downward and which the Finnish Communist Party follows in its own operations in conformance with its regulations, has caused opposition with the Finnish Communist Party and even the resignation of members. The pile-driver tactics with which the Finnish Communist Party directs the operations of its fellow traveler movements has also caused similar effects. The treatment of these

aspects in the explanation of Communist "democracy" is suitable material not only for one or two parties, but could be used by anyone.

41. "The best examples of Communist attitudes toward democracy can, however, be found in the People's Democracies. The practices followed in those countries are undeniable evidence that the Finnish Communist Party also continues to hold to its doctrine of dictatorship which the Finnish Communist Party has followed since its founding, and which in its own words it has never rejected.
42. "Equally as important as the continued explanation of the true Communist attitude toward democracy should be the explanation of the attitude that democracy must take in respect to the Communists. Democracy has both the right and the duty to defend itself against any form of dictatorship and therefore, also against Communism. But, unless this right is consciously and more effectively used, there exists a real danger that the Finnish Communist Party will attain the objective which it could not attain through market-place meetings and strike offensives by the use of a peaceful people's front tactic. The Finnish Communist Party is a far greater threat to Finnish democracy in the present situation than it has been formerly when the sociological disturbances incited by the Finnish Communist Party brought forth direct action and propaganda against it. The Communists now avoid giving such cause for opposition. For this very reason, Finnish democracy must rise to its own defense and not allow itself to fall asleep in false security."

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